The BrokenToken is a tool designed to automatically test smart contracts that interact with ERC20 tokens for unexpected behavior that may result in exploits. The ERC20 specification is loosely defined, and many developers violate the few semantic requirements that are imposed. This makes building smart contracts that interface directly with ERC20 tokens challenging.

The BrokenToken is based on a repository of minimal example implementations in Solidity of ERC20 tokens with behavior that may be surprising or unexpected. The tool is intended for use by developers and auditors to test smart contracts that utilize ERC20 tokens and identify potential vulnerabilities.

forge install zeroknots/brokentoken

Write your ERC20 foundry test as follows:

pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";

import {BrokenToken} from "brokentoken/BrokenToken.sol";


contract YourTest is Test, BrokenToken {

    function testFoobar() public useBrokenToken { // such wow. much easy.
        deal(address(brokenERC20), bob, 1_000_000);
        brokenERC20.approve(address(vault), 1_000_000);
    }
}

Or if you want to test weird ERC721

pragma solidity ^0.8.13;
import "forge-std/Test.sol";

import {BrokenToken} from "brokentoken/BrokenToken.sol";


contract YourTest is Test, BrokenToken {

    function testFoobar() public useBrokenNFT { // such wow. much easy.
        brokenERC721.mint(alice);
        brokenERC721.transferFrom(alice, bob, tokenId);
    }
}

• add more weird ERC20
• add weird ERC721
• add weird ERC1155

Please open a GH issue if you want me to add specific test cases

This test suite is currently heavily utilizing d-xo/weird-erc20 and implements following test cases:

Some tokens allow reentrant calls on transfer (e.g. ERC777 tokens).

This has been exploited in the wild on multiple occasions (e.g. imBTC Uniswap pool drained, lendf.me drained)

Some tokens do not return a bool (e.g. USDT, BNB, OMG) on ERC20 methods. see here for a comprehensive (if somewhat outdated) list.

Some tokens (e.g. BNB) may return a bool for some methods, but fail to do so for others. This resulted in stuck BNB tokens in Uniswap v1 (details).

Some particularly pathological tokens (e.g. Tether Gold) declare a bool return, but then return false even when the transfer was successful (code).

A good safe transfer abstraction (example) can help somewhat, but note that the existence of Tether Gold makes it impossible to correctly handle return values for all tokens.

Two example tokens are provided:

• MissingReturns: does not return a bool for any erc20 operation
• ReturnsFalse: declares a bool return, but then returns false for every erc20 operation

Some tokens take a transfer fee (e.g. STA, PAXG), some do not currently charge a fee but may do so in the future (e.g. USDT, USDC).

The STA transfer fee was used to drain $500k from several balancer pools (more details).

Some tokens may make arbitrary balance modifications outside of transfers (e.g. Ampleforth style rebasing tokens, Compound style airdrops of governance tokens, mintable/burnable tokens).

Some smart contract systems cache token balances (e.g. Balancer, Uniswap-V2), and arbitrary modifications to underlying balances can mean that the contract is operating with outdated information.

In the case of Ampleforth, some Balancer and Uniswap pools are special cased to ensure that the pool's cached balances are atomically updated as part of the rebase procedure (details).

example: TODO: implement a rebasing token

Some tokens (e.g. USDC, USDT) are upgradable, allowing the token owners to make arbitrary modifications to the logic of the token at any point in time.

A change to the token semantics can break any smart contract that depends on the past behaviour.

Developers integrating with upgradable tokens should consider introducing logic that will freeze interactions with the token in question if an upgrade is detected. (e.g. the TUSD adapter used by MakerDAO).

Some tokens (e.g. DAI) allow for so called "flash minting", which allows tokens to be minted for the duration of one transaction only, provided they are returned to the token contract by the end of the transaction.

This is similar to a flash loan, but does not require the tokens that are to be lent to exist before the start of the transaction. A token that can be flash minted could potentially have a total supply of max uint256.

Documentation for the MakerDAO flash mint module can be found here.

Some tokens (e.g. USDC, USDT) have a contract level admin controlled address blocklist. If an address is blocked, then transfers to and from that address are forbidden.

Malicious or compromised token owners can trap funds in a contract by adding the contract address to the blocklist. This could potentially be the result of regulatory action against the contract itself, against a single user of the contract (e.g. a Uniswap LP), or could also be a part of an extortion attempt against users of the blocked contract.

Some tokens can be paused by an admin (e.g. BNB, ZIL).

Similary to the blocklist issue above, an admin controlled pause feature opens users of the token to risk from a malicious or compromised token owner.

Some tokens (e.g. USDT, KNC) do not allow approving an amount M > 0 when an existing amount N > 0 is already approved. This is to protect from an ERC20 attack vector described here.

This PR shows some in the wild problems caused by this issue.

Some tokens (e.g. OpenZeppelin) will revert if trying to approve the zero address to spend tokens (i.e. a call to approve(address(0), amt)).

Integrators may need to add special cases to handle this logic if working with such a token.

Some tokens (e.g. LEND) revert when transferring a zero value amount.

Some proxied tokens have multiple addresses. As an example consider the following snippet. rescueFunds is intended to allow the contract owner to return non pool tokens that were accidentally sent to the contract. However, it assumes a single address per token and so would allow the owner to steal all funds in the pool.

mapping isPoolToken(address => bool);
constructor(address tokenA, address tokenB) public {
  isPoolToken[tokenA] = true;
  isPoolToken[tokenB] = true;
}
function rescueFunds(address token, uint amount) external nonReentrant onlyOwner {
    require(!isPoolToken[token], "access denied");
    token.transfer(msg.sender, amount);
}

Some tokens have low decimals (e.g. USDC has 6). Even more extreme, some tokens like Gemini USD only have 2 decimals.

This may result in larger than expected precision loss.

Some tokens have more than 18 decimals (e.g. YAM-V2 has 24).

This may trigger unexpected reverts due to overflow, posing a liveness risk to the contract.

Some token implementations (e.g. DSToken) will not attempt to decrease the caller's allowance if the sender is the same as the caller. This gives transferFrom the same semantics as transfer in this case. Other implementations (e.g. OpenZeppelin, Uniswap-v2) will attempt to decrease the caller's allowance from the sender in transferFrom even if the caller and the sender are the same address, giving transfer(dst, amt) and transferFrom(address(this), dst, amt) a different semantics in this case.

Some tokens (e.g. MKR) have metadata fields (name / symbol) encoded as bytes32 instead of the string prescribed by the ERC20 specification.

This may cause issues when trying to consume metadata from these tokens.

Some tokens (e.g. openzeppelin) revert when attempting to transfer to address(0).

This may break systems that expect to be able to burn tokens by transferring them to address(0).

Some tokens do not revert on failure, but instead return false (e.g. ZRX).

While this is technically compliant with the ERC20 standard, it goes against common solidity coding practices and may be overlooked by developers who forget to wrap their calls to transfer in a require.

Some tokens (e.g. UNI, COMP) revert if the value passed to approve or transfer is larger than uint96.

Both of the above tokens have special case logic in approve that sets allowance to type(uint96).max if the approval amount is uint256(-1), which may cause issues with systems that expect the value passed to approve to be reflected in the allowances mapping.

Some malicious tokens have been observed to include malicious javascript in their name attribute, allowing attackers to extract private keys from users who choose to interact with these tokens via vulnerable frontends.

This has been used to exploit etherdelta users in the wild (reference).

Some tokens (DAI, RAI, GLM, STAKE, CHAI, HAKKA, USDFL, HNY) have a permit() implementation that does not follow EIP2612. Tokens that do not support permit may not revert, which could lead to the execution of later lines of code in unexpected scenarios. Uniswap's Permit2 may provide a more compatible alternative.