你好 国密tls不是需要双证书的吗 我们以前给银行系统做的tls都是双证书 tassl里面也是双证书。 希望可以一起交流一下

看了下 似乎证书部分使用了sm2算法，其它部分没有，是否有计划继续？

在设置pkix.name中的country字段的时候，始终发现证书中显示的是NL字段，这是否是个bug呢？

哪里有java版本的gmtls？

2023/08/0117:38:35http:panicserving171.91.3.32:9055:runtimeerror:invalidmemoryaddressornilpointerdereference
goroutine207732[running]:
net/http.(*conn).serve.func1()
/usr/go/src/net/http/server.go:1802+0xb9
panic({0xf8f440,0x1b17d90})
/usr/go/src/runtime/panic.go:1047+0x266
github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls.finishedHash.clientSum({{0x127a458,0xc003b61500},{0x127a458,0xc003b61570},{0x127a418,0xc00b498d20},{0x127a418,0xc00b498d80},{0x0,0x0,...},...},...)
/root/go/pkg/mod/github.com/tjfoc/[email protected]/gmtls/prf.go:328+0x100
github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls.(*serverHandshakeState).readFinished(0xc00351b4a0,{0xc0023580e9,0xc,0xc0003e2240})
/root/go/pkg/mod/github.com/tjfoc/[email protected]/gmtls/handshake_server.go:615+0x1df
github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls.(*Conn).serverHandshake(0xc002358000)
/root/go/pkg/mod/github.com/tjfoc/[email protected]/gmtls/handshake_server.go:103+0x232
github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls.(*Conn).Handshake(0xc002358000)
/root/go/pkg/mod/github.com/tjfoc/[email protected]/gmtls/conn.go:1289+0x1ca
github.com/tjfoc/gmsm/gmtls.(*Conn).Read(0xc002358000,{0xc004389000,0x1000,0xc009c42788})
/root/go/pkg/mod/github.com/tjfoc/[email protected]/gmtls/conn.go:1141+0x55
git.woa.com/bmax/go-nginx/chttp.(*SecConn).Read(0xc009c42780,{0xc004389000,0x10538a0,0xc00c0e8601})
/root/go/pkg/mod/git.woa.com/bmax/[email protected]/chttp/chttp_conn.go:24+0x26
net/http.(*connReader).Read(0xc009c42780,{0xc004389000,0x1000,0x1000})

请问gmtls有没有支持tls 1.3的计划

Greetings!

Sorry, but which version of TLS is this? 1.1, 1.2?

	if *tcpip == "listen" {
		cert, err := gmtls.X509KeyPair(certpem, pripem)

		if err != nil {
			log.Fatal(err)
		}
		config := gmtls.Config{Certificates: []gmtls.Certificate{cert}, ClientAuth: gmtls.RequireAnyClientCert}
		config.Rand = rand.Reader

		port := "8081"
		if *public != "" {
			port = *public
		}

		ln, err := gmtls.Listen("tcp", ":"+port, &config)
		if err != nil {
			log.Fatal(err)
		}

		fmt.Fprintln(os.Stderr, "Server(TLS) up and listening on port "+port)

		conn, err := ln.Accept()
		if err != nil {
			log.Println(err)
		}
		defer ln.Close()

		fmt.Println("Connection accepted")

		for {
			message, err := bufio.NewReader(conn).ReadString('\n')
			if err != nil {
				fmt.Println(err)
				os.Exit(3)
			}
			fmt.Print("Received: ", string(message))

			newmessage := strings.ToUpper(message)
			conn.Write([]byte(newmessage + "\n"))
		}
	}
	
	if *tcpip == "dial" {
		cert, err := gmtls.X509KeyPair(certpem, pripem)

		if err != nil {
			log.Fatal(err)
		}

		ipport := "127.0.0.1:8081"
		if *public != "" {
			ipport = *public
		}

		config := gmtls.Config{Certificates: []gmtls.Certificate{cert}, InsecureSkipVerify: true}
		conn, err := gmtls.Dial("tcp", ipport, &config)
		if err != nil {
			log.Fatal(err)
		}
		certs := conn.ConnectionState().PeerCertificates
		for _, cert := range certs {
			fmt.Printf("Issuer Name: %s\n", cert.Issuer)
			fmt.Printf("Expiry: %s \n", cert.NotAfter.Format("Monday, 02-Jan-06 15:04:05 MST"))
			fmt.Printf("Common Name: %s \n", cert.Issuer.CommonName)
			fmt.Printf("IP Address: %s \n", cert.IPAddresses)
		}
		if err != nil {
			log.Fatal(err)
		}
		defer conn.Close()

		for {
			reader := bufio.NewReader(os.Stdin)
			fmt.Print("Text to be sent: ")
			text, err := reader.ReadString('\n')
			if err != nil {
				fmt.Println(err)
				os.Exit(3)
			}
			fmt.Fprintf(conn, text+"\n")

			message, err := bufio.NewReader(conn).ReadString('\n')
			if err != nil {
				fmt.Println(err)
				os.Exit(3)
			}
			fmt.Print("Server response: " + message)
		}
	}

Thanks in advance!

如题，谢谢！

Hi, we are a research group to help developers build secure applications. We designed a cryptographic misuse detector (i.e., CryptoGo) on Go language. We found your great public repository from Github, and several security issues detected by CryptoGo are shown in the following.
Note that the cryptographic algorithms are categorized with two aspects: security strength and security vulnerability based on NIST Special Publication 800-57 and other public publications. Moreover, CryptoGo defined certain rules derived from the APIs of Go cryptographic library and other popular cryptographic misuse detectors. The specific security issues we found are as follows:
(1) Location: key_agreement.go:115
Broken rule: MD5 is an insecure algorithm;
(2) Location: prf.go:219
Broken rule: MD5 is an insecure algorithm;
(3) Location: prf.go:352
Broken rule: MD5 is an insecure algorithm;
(4) Location: prf.go:95
Broken rule: MD5 is an insecure algorithm;
(5) Location: cipher_suites.go:120
Broken rule: RC4 is an insecure algorithm;
(6) Location: cipher_suites.go:144
Broken rule: SHA-1 is an insecure algorithm;
(7) Location: key_agreement.go:104
Broken rule: SHA-1 is an insecure algorithm;
(8) Location: prf.go:219
Broken rule: SHA-1 is an insecure algorithm;
(9) Location: prf.go:354
Broken rule: SHA-1 is an insecure algorithm;
(10) Location: prf.go:94
Broken rule: SHA-1 is an insecure algorithm;
(11) Location: cipher_suites.go:125
Broken rule: 3TDEA is acceptable but not recommended;
(12) Location: prf.go:38
Broken rule: HMAC-MD5 is acceptable but not recommended;
(13) Location: cipher_suites.go:133
Broken rule: Constant key in AES;
(14) Location: ticket.go:206
Broken rule: Not unique IV in CTR;
(15) Location: key_agreement.go:90
Broken rule: RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 is deprecated;
(16) Location: key_agreement.go:329
Broken rule: The ScalarMult method of Package curve25519 is deprecated;
(17) Location: key_agreement.go:477
Broken rule: The ScalarMult method of Package curve25519 is deprecated;
We wish the above security issues could truly help you to build a secure application. If you have any concern or suggestion, please feel free to contact us, we are looking forward to your reply. Thanks.