smyslov / g-ikev2 Goto Github PK

Current text is wrong

Remove it.

Do we need to update USE_TRANSPORT_MODE for multicast use or allocate a new notify?

Text should be added to clarify how to interpret Proposal Number field in SAg payload.

Do we want to make G-IKEv2 SA secure against QC from the very beginning? Currently only confidentiality of the keys is preserved, but not their authenticity (integrity). We may want to add ICV to Wrapped Key structure or to the whole KD payload.

Since replay protection isn't used there is no point to specify ESN transform in GSA payload.

Currently a key wrapping format assumes that there is no ICV field (because the whole IKE message is authenticated, and integrity protected) and the format provides only confidentiality. This appeasr to be a problem when AEAD algorithms are in use - existing APIs require ICV to be present on decryption.

As a possible solution we can switch format resembling the Encrypted payload. The penalty would be that each wrapped key will have its own ICV, thus making messages bigger (especially with LKH).

The text at the end of 1.4.5.1 contradicts to the text in 3.5.3 and is a left-over from previous version of the document, but 3.5.3 is wrong too, since Member Packet can be sent in multicast rekey...