Produces secure keys and passwords.
- ๐ Secure: audited noble cryptography
- ๐ป Tree-shakeable: unused code is excluded from your builds
- ๐ฒ Produce known (deterministic) and random keys
- ๐ SSH, PGP, TOR, IPNS, SLIP10 keys
- ๐ช BLS12-381 keys for ETH validators
- ๐ Generate secure passwords & OTP 2FA codes
Used in: terminal7 WebRTC terminal multiplexer.
npm install micro-key-producer
import ssh from 'micro-key-producer/ssh.js';
import pgp from 'micro-key-producer/pgp.js';
import * as pwd from 'micro-key-producer/password.js';
import * as otp from 'micro-key-producer/otp.js';
import tor from 'micro-key-producer/tor.js';
import ipns from 'micro-key-producer/ipns.js';
import slip10 from 'micro-key-producer/slip10.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
Every method takes a seed (key), from which the formatted result is produced.
A seed can be known (a.k.a. deterministic - it will always produce the same result), or random.
// known: (deterministic) Uses known mnemonic (handled in separate package)
import { mnemonicToSeedSync } from '@scure/bip39';
const mnemonic = 'letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage above';
const knownSeed = mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, '');
// random: Uses system's CSPRNG to produce new random seed
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
const randSeed = randomBytes(32);
import ssh from 'micro-key-producer/ssh.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(32);
const key = ssh(seed, '[email protected]');
console.log(key.fingerprint, key.privateKey, key.publicKey);
// SHA256:3M832z6j5R6mQh4TTzVG5KVs2Ibvy...
// -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- ...
// ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAA...
The PGP (GPG) keys conform to RFC 4880 & RFC 6637. Only ed25519 algorithm is currently supported.
import pgp, { getKeyId } from 'micro-key-producer/pgp.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(32);
const email = '[email protected]';
const pass = 'password';
const createdAt = Date.now(); // optional; timestamp >= 0
const keyId = getKeyId(seed);
const key = pgp(seed, email, pass, createdAt);
console.log(key.fingerprint, key.privateKey, key.publicKey);
// ca88e2a8afd9cdb8
// -----BEGIN PGP PRIVATE KEY BLOCK-----...
// -----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----...
import { mnemonicToSeedSync } from '@scure/bip39';
import { createDerivedEIP2334Keystores } from 'micro-key-producer/bls.js';
const password = 'my_password';
const mnemonic = 'letter advice cage absurd amount doctor acoustic avoid letter advice cage above';
const keyType = 'signing'; // or 'withdrawal'
const indexes = [0, 1, 2, 3]; // create 4 keys
const keystores = createDerivedEIP2334Keystores(
password
'scrypt',
mnemonicToSeedSync(mnemonic, ''),
keyType,
indexes
);
Conforms to EIP-2333 / EIP-2334 / EIP-2335. Online demo: eip2333-tool
import * as pwd from 'micro-key-producer/password.js';
import { randomBytes } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
const seed = randomBytes(32);
const pass = pwd.secureMask.apply(seed).password;
// wivfi1-Zykrap-fohcij, will change on each run
// secureMask is format from iOS keychain, see "Detailed API" section
Supports iOS / macOS Safari Secure Password from Keychain. Optional zxcvbn score for password bruteforce estimation
import * as otp from 'micro-key-producer/otp.js';
otp.hotp(otp.parse('ZYTYYE5FOAGW5ML7LRWUL4WTZLNJAMZS'), 0n); // 549419
otp.totp(otp.parse('ZYTYYE5FOAGW5ML7LRWUL4WTZLNJAMZS'), 0); // 549419
Conforms to RFC 6238.
import tor from 'micro-key-producer/tor.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(32);
const key = tor(seed);
console.log(key.privateKey, key.publicKey);
// ED25519-V3:EOl78M2gA...
// rx724x3oambzxr46pkbd... .onion
import ipns from 'micro-key-producer/ipns.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(32);
const k = ipns(seed);
console.log(k.privateKey, k.publicKey, k.base16, k.base32, k.base36, k.contenthash);
// 0x080112400681d6420abb1b...
// 0x017200240801122012c829...
// ipns://f0172002408011220...
// ipns://bafzaajaiaejcaewi...
// ipns://k51qzi5uqu5dgnfwb...
// 0xe501017200240801122012...
import slip10 from 'micro-key-producer/slip10.js';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils.js';
const seed = randomBytes(32);
const hdkey1 = slip10.HDKey.fromMasterSeed(seed);
// props
[hdkey1.depth, hdkey1.index, hdkey1.chainCode];
console.log(hdkey2.privateKey, hdkey2.publicKey);
console.log(hdkey3.derive("m/0/2147483647'/1'"));
const sig = hdkey3.sign(hash);
hdkey3.verify(hash, sig);
SLIP10 (ed25519 BIP32) HDKey implementation has been funded by the Kin Foundation for Kinetic.
- Generated private and public keys would have different representation, however, their fingerprints would be the same. This is because AES encryption is used to hide the keys, and AES requires different IV / salt.
- The function is slow (~725ms on Apple M1), because it uses S2K to derive keys.
- "warning: lower 3 bits of the secret key are not cleared" happens even for keys generated with GnuPG 2.3.6, because check looks at item as Opaque MPI, when it is just MPI: see bugtracker URL.
import * as pgp from 'micro-key-producer/pgp';
import { randomBytes } from 'micro-key-producer/utils';
const pseed = randomBytes(32);
pgp.getKeyId(pseed); // fast
const pkeys = pgp.getKeys(pseed, '[email protected]', 'password');
console.log(pkeys.keyId);
console.log(pkeys.privateKey);
console.log(pkeys.publicKey);
// Also, you can explore existing keys internal structure
console.log(pgp.pubArmor.decode(keys.publicKey));
const privDecoded = pgp.privArmor.decode(keys.privateKey);
console.log(privDecoded);
// And receive raw private keys as bigint
console.log({
ed25519: pgp.decodeSecretKey('password', privDecoded[0].data),
cv25519: pgp.decodeSecretKey('password', privDecoded[3].data),
});
import * as pwd from 'micro-key-producer/password.js';
console.log(pwd.secureMask.estimate);
// Output
{
score: 'somewhat guessable', // ZXCVBN Score
// Guess times
guesses: {
online_throttling: '1y 115mo', // Throttled online attack
online: '1mo 10d', // Online attack
// Offline attack (salte, slow hash function like bcrypt, scrypt, PBKDF2, argon, etc)
slow: '57min 36sec',
fast: '0 sec' // Offline attack
},
// Estimated attack costs (in $)
costs: {
luks: 1.536122841572242, // LUKS (Linux FDE)
filevault2: 0.2308740987992559, // FileVault 2 (macOS FDE)
macos: 0.03341598798410283, // MaccOS v10.8+ passwords
pbkdf2: 0.011138662661367609 // PBKDF2 (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256)
}
}
Mask | Description | Example |
---|---|---|
1 | digits | 4, 7, 5, 0 |
@ | symbols | !, @, %, ^ |
v | vowels | a, e, i |
c | consonant | b, c, d |
a | letter (vowel or consonant) | a, b, e, c |
V | uppercase vowel | A, E, I |
C | uppercase consonant | B, C, D |
A | uppercase letter | A, B, E, C |
l | lower and upper case letters | A, b, C |
n | same as 'l', but also digits | A, 1, b, 2, C |
* | same as 'n', but also symbols | A, 1, !, b, @ |
s | syllable (same as 'cv') | ca, re, do |
S | Capitalized syllable (same as 'Cv) | Ca, Ti, Je |
All other characters used as is |
Examples:
- Mask:
Cvccvc-cvccvc-cvccv1
will generateMavmuq-xadgys-poqsa5
- Mask
@Ss-ss-ss
will generate:*Tavy-qyjy-vemo
Most strict password rules (so password will be accepted everywhere):
- at least one upper-case character
- at least one lower-case character
- at least one symbol
- at least one digit
- length greater or equal to 8
These rules don't significantly increase password entropy (most humans will use mask like 'Aaaaaa1@' or any other popular mask),
but they means that we cannot simple use mask like
********
, since it can generate passwords which won't satisfy these rules.
- length: entering 32 character password for FDE via IPMI java applet on remote server is pretty painful. -> 12-16 probably ok, anything with more characters has chance to be truncated by service.
- readability: entering '!#%!$#Y^&*#%@#!!1' from air-gapped pc is hard.
- entropy:
- 32 bit is likely to be brutforced via network
- 64 bit: 22 days && 1.6k$ at 4x V100: https://blog.trailofbits.com/2019/11/27/64-bits-ought-to-be-enough-for-anybody/ but it is simple loop, if there is something like pbkdf before password, it will significantly slowdown everything
- 80 bits is probably outside of budget for most attackers (btc hash rate) even if there is major speedup for specific algorithm
- For websites and services we don't care much about entropy, since passwords are unique and there is no re-usage, however for FDE / server password entropy is pretty important
- no fancy and unique mask by default: we don't want to fingeprint users
- any mask will leak eventually (even if user choices personal mask, there will be password leaks from websites),
so we cannot calculate entropy by
******
mask, we need to calculate entropy for specific mask (which is smaller). - Password generator should be reversible, that way we can easily proof entropy/strength of password.
SLIP-0010 hierarchical deterministic (HD) wallets for implementation. Based on code from scure-bip32. Check out scure-bip39 if you also need mnemonic phrases.
- SLIP-0010 publicKey is 33 bytes (see
this issue), if you want 32-byte publicKey,
use
.publicKeyRaw
getter - SLIP-0010 vectors fingerprint is actually
parentFingerprint
- SLIP-0010 doesn't allow deriving non-hardened keys for Ed25519, however some other libraries treat
non-hardened keys (
m/0/1
) as hardened (m/0'/1'
). If you want this behaviour, there is a flagforceHardened
inderive
method
Note: chainCode
property is essentially a private part of a secret "master" key, it should be
guarded from unauthorized access.
The full API is:
class HDKey {
public static HARDENED_OFFSET: number;
public static fromMasterSeed(seed: Uint8Array | string): HDKey;
readonly depth: number = 0;
readonly index: number = 0;
readonly chainCode: Uint8Array | null = null;
readonly parentFingerprint: number = 0;
public readonly privateKey: Uint8Array;
get fingerprint(): number;
get fingerprintHex(): string;
get parentFingerprintHex(): string;
get pubKeyHash(): Uint8Array;
get publicKey(): Uint8Array;
get publicKeyRaw(): Uint8Array;
derive(path: string, forceHardened = false): HDKey;
deriveChild(index: number): HDKey;
sign(hash: Uint8Array): Uint8Array;
verify(hash: Uint8Array, signature: Uint8Array): boolean;
}
MIT (c) Paul Miller (https://paulmillr.com), see LICENSE file.